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The directional and proximity models offer dramatically different theories for how voters
make decisions and fundamentally divergent views of the supposed microfoundations on
which vast bodies of literature in theoretical rational choice and empirical political behavior
have been built. We demonstrate here that the empirical tests in the large and growing
body of literature on this subject amount to theoretical debates about which statistical
assumption is right. The key statistical assumptions have not been empirically tested and,
indeed, turn out to be effectively untestable with existing methods and data. Unfortunately,
these assumptions are also crucial since changing them leads to different conclusions
about voter decision processes.
1 Introduction
Since Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) ﬁrst proposed their “directional” spatial voting
model, over 25 scholarly articles have been devoted to the subject. While some of these
papers have sought to articulate the implications of the theory (Merrill 1993) or to gen-
eralize it by, for example, explicitly incorporating uncertainty into the model (Macdonald
and Rabinowitz 1993b), most debate its empirical merits. Does it work in the United
States, France (Pierce 1997), Norway (Macdonald et al. 1991; Westholm 1997), Sweden
(Gilljam 1997), Germany (Kramer and Rattinger 1997), or The Netherlands (Macdonald
and Rabinowitz 1996a)? Does it explain roll call voting decisions in the U.S. Congress
(Platt et al. 1992)? Does it describe all voters or only unsophisticated voters (Macdonald
et al. 1995b)?
Beyond its theoretical merits, interest in the directional model has been sustained by the
prominence of the alternative against which it has generally been tested. What contributors
to the directional voting literature refer to as the “proximity model” has so dominated the
researchonspatialrepresentationsofvoterpreferencesthatitisgenerallyreferredtoas“the
spatial theory of voting” (see Hinich and Enelow 1984). The familiar spatial model has a
long theoretical and empirical tradition. Well-known results including the Median Voter
Authors’ note: Our thanks goes to Jim Alt, Mo Fiorina, Torben Iversen, Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George
Rabinowitz, andAndersWestholmforhelpfulcomments, andtheNationalScienceFoundation(SBR-9729884),
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Theorem of Black (1958) and Hotelling (1929), the McKelvey (1976) Chaos Theorem,
Shepsle and Weingast’s (1981) Structure-Induced Equilibrium, and Poole and Rosenthal’s
(1985) Nominate Scores are predicated on the idea that politics can be represented as a
Euclidean space (the proximity model) and not an inner product space (the directional
model).1
The contributors to the literature on directional versus proximity voting are ﬁghting
over two central political science issues: our understanding of a basic feature of the po-
litical world—how voters make decisions—and a prominent aspect of our data collection
strategies—how randomly chosen respondents answer imprecisely worded survey ques-
tions. On one hand, we have a group of scholars who have championed directional theory
for a decade, and on the other we have a large body of theoretical and empirical rational
choice research that rests on the veracity of the proximity model. Despite substantial effort
and much thoughtful analysis, the scholarly community does not seem much closer to a
resolution. We attempt to explain why this debate persists.
Ourpurposeisnottodeclareawinner,ortoplayTedKoppel’sroleonNightline(“Didyou
hearwhathesaidaboutyourmother?”),butrathertoclarifythecomplicatedissuesinvolved
intestingthesetheoriesandtolaybaretheassumptionsonewouldneedtoconcludethatone
side, rather than the other, is correct. Our main argument is that the existing data contain
insufﬁcientinformationwithwhichtodistinguishthetwotheories. Theresultisthatalarge
andsupposedlyempiricalliterature,designedtoanswertheempiricalquestionofhowvoters
make decisions, too often amounts to data-free debates about which untested assumption is
right. More speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that (1) in the most general formulation, support
foreachmodelismarginalatbest; (2)eachsetofauthorsisabletoproduceresultsthatseem
to favor their position only by making (and justifying in a variety of interesting theoretical
ways) different untested methodological assumptions; and (3) the data are not sufﬁciently
rich to allow an appropriate test that can distinguish between the opposing assumptions
employed by each. Despite much hard work, it is still not possible to decide who is right
using the kinds of data and methodologies that have been employed in the literature.
Forsimplicity, ourreferencestotheliteraturedrawonthetwomostrecentarticlesinthis
debate when possible. That is, we take Westholm (1997) as our exemplar of the defenders
of the proximity model and Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug (1998) (hereafter MRL)
as our exemplar of the defenders of directional theory. Using identical data, the authors
ﬁnd apparently equally strong but opposing support for their favored model.
2 Deﬁnitions
One way to interpret the common starting point of both theories of voting is by the common
assumption that candidates for ofﬁce can be arrayed on an underlying dimension, such as
liberal to conservative.2 Figure 1 gives an example with some well-known senators from
the 104th congress.3
1References to many notable empirical tests of the spatial voting model in the context of electoral competition
are given by Hinich and Enelow (1984, 1989). Countless papers have assumed the spatial model in testing other
hypotheses.
2In many applications, candidates are ordered in multidimensional space. We use one dimension to clarify the
underlying concepts. For expository purposes, here and elsewhere, we use the simplest possible examples and
forms of the theories at issue. Both bodies of literature elaborate in many useful ways, but the elaborations do
not change the essential points.
3We took the exact ideological positions from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) but the same ideas (and, in the case of
well-known senators, nearly the same positions) apply regardless of method. The latter is important since Poole
and Rosenthal’s methods happen to be based on proximity theory.P1: FBW
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Fig. 1 Senators on an ideological dimension: the dimension ranges from the
most liberal at the left to the most conservative at the right. A few senators and
“YOU” are located as ﬁlled circles on the dimension. The small vertical bar at the
middle represents the neutral point required under directional theory.
Figure 1 is a familiar representation of an ideological issue space, ranging from Edward
Kennedy at the most liberal end to Jesse Helms at the most conservative. For illustrative
purposes, we have also added “YOU” to this dimension, with preferences slightly to the left
of center.
According to the proximity model, voters prefer candidates closest to them on this
dimensional scale. So, according to the model, You would prefer Olympia Snowe as your
representative to any of the other senators. Also, the farther away from your position, the
less you like the representative. Hence, after Snowe, You prefer Nancy Kassebaum, then
Sam Nunn, Edward Kennedy, and, ﬁnally, Jesse Helms.
In contrast, under the directional model, voters prefer candidates “on their side,” and the
more on their side the better. A “side” might be a politically meaningful grouping such
as a political party or a like-minded set of people who agree with some basic ideological
premises. In the ﬁgure, “sides” are determined by your position relative to the neutral point
(marked by the vertical line in Fig. 1). Thus, according to the model, You prefer those to
the left of zero more than those to the right, because You are on the left. Moreover, You
have the strongest intensity of preferences for the extreme candidates on your side because
they are most clearly members of your “team.” Thus You and everyone else located on the
“Liberal” side have the same preference ordering: Kennedy, Nunn, Snowe, Kassabaum,
Helms. However“sides”aredeﬁned,thepositionoftheneutralpointiscriticalindirectional
theory (and irrelevant in proximity theory).
MRL exclude from this scheme truly extremist candidates who fall outside of what they
call the “region of acceptability” that they use to deﬁne mainstream politics. The elected
U.S. senators who make up our current example all probably fall within the acceptable
region. Thus, under directional theory, voters would penalize more extreme candidates (for
example, perhaps, the Right-to-Life Party candidates in New York State or the occasional
Communist Party candidate elsewhere).
In some formulations, directional theory describes something closer to the respondent’s
answer to a survey question than a traditional ideological scale. In that situation, the idea
is that people decide only what side they are on and how intense they feel, in which case
the underlying ideological dimension in Fig. 1 has a different interpretation than it has in a
traditional spatial modeling framework. Indeed, whether respondents use the intermediate
values of issues scales to convey their preferences for intermediate policy positions or to
reﬂect the strength of their commitments to one or the other of the positions that anchor the
scale is central to this debate. Whether the empirical tests presented below and elsewhere
in the literature tell us more about how respondents conceive of Likert scales or how they
conceive of politics more generally is of course unclear.
The debate in the literature is focused on whether it is the proximity or directional model
that best explains voter behavior. However, implicit in this debate is the simultaneously
determined question of what dimension (or dimensions) people use to decide. This makes
thequestionofproximityvsdirectionconditionalonwhatdimensionisbeingusedbyvotersP1: FBW
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oranalyzedbyresearchers,sinceitcouldbethecasethatpeoplefollowtheproximitymodel
on some dimensions and the directional model on others.4
3 A Formal Statement of the Models
In this section we formally deﬁne the directional and proximity models of voter decision
making. We also introduce a general model that includes both as special cases. This model
helps us clarify the theories in this section and the methods and assumptions necessary to
produce valid empirical tests, in the next.
Let vi be the numerical position of voter i (for i D 1;:::;n) on some issue or ideolog-
ical dimension like that in Fig. 1 (where the underline points out the mnemonic labeling
convention we adopt). Also, let cij be the ideological position of candidate (or party) j on
the same dimension as presented to voter i. For this conceptual section, we treat vi and cij
as theoretical quantities that could be measured without error. Even without considering
measurement error or psychological concepts such as perception, cij may in fact vary over
i if the candidates present themselves differently to different groups, which is after all the
point of many targeted campaign appeals. The neutral point is deﬁned as zero.
While they differ as to how voter utility is deﬁned, both sides agree that utility theory
governsactualdecisionmaking. Soavoterwouldchoosetocastaballotforcandidate1over
candidate 2 if the voter’s utility for 1 is higher than for 2. What distinguishes the various
modelsofvoterdecisionmakingisthevoter’sutilityfunction. Underthedirectionalmodel,
the utility of voter i for candidate j is
Ud
ij D ®d C¯d(vicij) (1)
where®d and¯d (>0)areunknownconstants. Thisequationindicatesthatwhenavoterand
a candidate are on the same side of the neutral point, the voter’s utility under the directional
model is lowest when the voter or the candidate is near the neutral point (i.e., zero) and
highestwhenbothareontheextremeofthesamesideoftheneutralpoint. Thesecondterm
is negative if the voter and candidate are on opposite sides and is increasingly negative as
the voter or the candidate become more extreme. [We sidestep concerns about the region
of acceptability in the analyses below by also running a version of our speciﬁcations that
drop extremist parties; so for simplicity, Eq. (1) excludes penalties for candidates that fall
outside this region, as would otherwise be required by directional theory.]
Under the proximity model, the voter’s utility is most commonly written as
U
p
ij D ®p ¡¯p(vi ¡cij)2
D ®p ¡¯v2
i ¡¯pc2
ij C¯p(2vicij) (2)
where ¯ p > 0. Eq. (2) deﬁnes a voter’s maximum expected utility as occurring when the
voter and candidate are at the same position. The less proximate the two positions are, the
lower the voter’s expected utility.5
4Almost all formal theory work assumes the proximity model. Two interesting papers by Merrill (1993, 1995)
explore the theoretical consequences for this literature of assuming instead that the directional model applies.
5Sometimes the absolute (or “city block”) rather than the squared (“Euclidean”) distance between vi and cij is
used as a distance measure, but these rarely differ empirically by very much. We choose the squared Euclidean
distance because it is more commonly chosen and allows us to nest the directional and proximity models within
our “general” model. A similar (though slightly better) ﬁt is achieved using Euclidean distances rather than
squared Euclidean distances. Note, also, that ® and ¯ have different meanings in Eqs. (1) and (2).P1: FBW
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Our general encompassing model comes from letting the three ¯’s in the second line of
Eq. (2) differ:
U
g
ij D ® ¡¯vv2
i ¡¯cc2
ij C¯2(2vicij) (3)
The special cases of this general model produce the two behavioral models at issue. The
general model equals the directional model (i.e.,U
g
ij D Ud
ij) when ¯v D ¯c D 0 and ¯2 > 0.
Thegeneralmodelspecializestotheproximitymodel(U
g
ij D U
p
ij)when¯v D ¯c D ¯2 > 0.
Unlike the directional and proximity models, Eq. (3) is not meant as a theory of voter
behavior, only as a device to understand and subsequently evaluate the two behavioral
models as special cases.6
In the simplest possible case, we have only two parties and one issue. If we had a survey
with n interviews, our data set constructed for the analysis would have 2n observations (n
for each party).7 The effect of additional issues on utility is assumed here and elsewhere in
this literature to be additive. Each additional issue enters the model in the same way as the
ﬁrst and receives its own value of vi, cij, and (2vicij).
4 Alternative Assumptions for Empirical Testing
We now describe three alternative sets of assumptions under which it is possible to estimate
the parameters of the model and hence distinguish between the proximity and directional
models.
Most applications in this literature measure a voter’s utility for a candidate or party with
a “feeling thermometer,” a survey question resulting in a scale from 0 (feeling “cold” about
a candidate) to 50 (the neutral point) to 100 (a “warm” feeling). The voter’s position vi and
thecandidate’spositionaspresentedtoeachvotercij aremeasuredwith7-or10-pointLikert
issue scale questions put to voters. Since the parameters of interest are a linear function of
squares and products of variables, they can be estimated by least squares regression.
4.1 Optimistic Assumptions
Suppose we were willing to believe that all the methodological problems one might raise
were sufﬁciently minor such that, if ignored, they would not change our conclusions about
which theory is correct, or, if corrected, the estimates would be no better. This is a useful
starting point in most analyses, especially for understanding the relationships in the data
and how imposing alternative assumptions affects these relationships.
In the present case, an optimistic approach to estimation means we could estimate
®;¯v;¯ c,and¯2 inEq. (3)byregressingthefeelingthermometeronaconstantterm,v2
i ;c2
ij,
and (2vicij). To provide a feel for the kind of information in the data, we implemented this
with the 1989 Norwegian Election Study,8 the same data set used by Westholm and MRL
6Rabinowitz and Macdonald’s (1989) so-called “mixed” model is also a special case of our general model, when
¯v D ¯c and ¯2 > 0. Its authors sometimes think of the mixed model as useful for understanding and statistical
testing, as we do our encompassing model, but they sometimes also treat it as a model of voter behavior in its
own right.
7With more than one issue, our general model becomes U
g
ij D ® ¡v0
i¯vvi ¡c0
ij¯ccij C2v0
i¯2cij, where c and v
are now vectors and the ¯’s are now diagonal matrices.
8Data distributed by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Bernt Aardal and Henry Valen were
the Principal Investigators and the Norwegian Gallup Institute collected the data.P1: FBW
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(N D 8833).9 (We also replicated the same analyses in U.S. data, which we do not present
here; the results are highly consistent with the analyses and conclusions below.10) We did
the estimation for all seven political parties and six issues (a general left–right scale, the
environment, agriculture, immigration, health policy, and alcohol restriction). Continuing
thenotationdevelopedabove, denotingthefeelingthermometerscoresofvoteri evaluating
candidate j as Tij and indexing each of the issues by k, we estimate the following equation
by least squares:
Tij D ® ¡
6 X
kD1
¯vkv2
ik ¡
6 X
kD1
¯ckc2
ijk C
6 X
kD1
¯ 2k(2vikcijk)C² ij (4)
With six issues, we have six ¯v’s, ¯c’s and ¯2’s to estimate—one for each corresponding
v2
i ;c2
ij, and (2vicij). The results, which appear in Table 1, indicate that ¯v is usually fairly
close to zero, but ¯c and ¯2 are both large and positive.11 Thus, before correcting any
methodological problems, the results do not provide unambiguous support for either the
directional model (which requires ¯v D ¯c D 0 and ¯2 > 0) or the proximity model (which
requires ¯v D ¯c D ¯2 > 0).
IftheresultsinTable1aresomixed,howareWestholmandMRLabletodrawsuchstrong
andopposingconclusions? Theanswerdependscriticallyontheirdifferingmethodological
assumptions and resulting statistical corrections, a subject to which we now turn.
4.2 Assumptions that Favor Directional Theory
MRLworrythatcandidateissueplacements,asmeasured,maybeendogenoustothefeeling
thermometer and thus may be systematically biased. To correct for this problem, MRL12
replace each respondent’s perception of a candidate issue position cij with the average issue
position in the sample for each party, cj D
Pn
iD1 cij=n. If the true value of cij is indeed
9MRL (1998) argue that Norway’s Socialist Left and the Progressive parties are outside of the “region of ac-
ceptability” and thus voters will not use directional logic when evaluating them. Instead, these parties suffer
some “penalty” for their extreme views. Rather than trying to model the “penalty” directly, we reﬁt all of
the models in this paper after excluding these parties. The substantive results given in the text are not altered
when these parties are omitted, though the number of issues that can be considered is reduced by two due to
an identiﬁcation problem described below. The number of observations is n D 2198 respondents£7 parties ¡
missing party-respondent pairsD8833.
10Tobespeciﬁc, wereplicatedtheanalysiswithU.S.datausingthe1948–1996NESCumulativeDataFile(ICPSR
Study No. 8475). In this replication, we used the feeling thermometer scores for all major party presidential can-
didates from 1972 to 1996 and placements on the liberal–conservative and government guaranteed employment
7-point scales. We choose these two scales because they were included on all NES surveys in the 1972 to 1996
period. As with the Norwegian data, the estimated ¯c’s are similar in magnitude to the ¯2’s, while the ¯v’s are
small. Similar results were obtained using the other issue scales included in the data set (equality for women,
relations with Russia, minority aid, social services spending, and defense spending) for the subsets of years in
which they were asked. Tables and program ﬁles for this replication are available in the replication data set that
accompanies this article.
11The average standard errors given in Table 1 are generated by the usual OLS estimator. One might be concerned
that the regression errors are not independent across observations involving the same respondent. If this sort of
dependence is present, the OLS standard error estimates are biased and inconsistent. We also employed a Huber
sandwich-typeestimatorthatisconsistentinthepresenceofwithin-respondentdependence. Thestandarderrors
estimated in this way were in all cases within §0:01 of the reported standard errors.
12MRL argue that, without this correction, projection effects bias the results toward the Euclidean model. [Pro-
jection is the tendency for voters who are uncertain of the parties’ issue positions to locate parties they prefer
closetotheirownposition(seeBrodyandPage1972).] Westholm(1997)arguesthatitissomewhatinconsistent
to assert that voters would locate candidates they prefer close to themselves, but when assuming the directionalP1: FBW
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Table 1 Estimates of the general model:
Roughly speaking, ˆ ¯v ¼ 0; ˆ ¯c > 0, and ˆ ¯2 > 0a
Issue ˆ ¯v ˆ ¯c ˆ ¯2
Left–right ¡0.15 0.32 0.64
Agriculture ¡0.03 0.28 0.22
Environment 0.04 0.13 0.23
Immigration ¡0.10 0.29 0.16
Alcohol ¡0.08 0.28 0.24
Health 0.04 ¡0.23 0.23
(Average SE) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
a For this table, and all that follow, N D 8833.
constant over i, this procedure averages away much of the measurement error and may
go some way toward solving the methodological problem. However, if candidates present
different ideological positions to different groups of voters (or different voters receive
different messages), so that cij is not constant, the procedure will introduce measurement
error. Whether or not cij is in fact constant over i, replacing it with cj has important side
effects for estimation.
Table2repeatstheregressioninTable1withthesemeanpartyplacements. Theresultsfor
this table are qualitatively the same, except that estimates of ¯c are now much less precisely
Table 2 Estimates of the general model with
mean party placements: Roughly speaking, ˆ ¯v ¼ 0;
ˆ ¯c > 0, and ˆ ¯2 > 0a
Issue ˆ ¯v ˆ ¯c ˆ ¯2
Left–right 0.02 ¡0.46 0.90
Agriculture ¡0.03 ¡0.17 0.25
Environment 0.01 ¡0.26 0.18
Immigration 0.02 2.78 0.35
Alcohol ¡0.09 ¡0.31 0.29
Health 0.11 ¡1.47 0.25
(Average SE) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02)
a Note that compared to the estimates given in Table 1,
¯c is much less precisely estimated.
model, voters would not in general prefer candidates that are in close proximity to themselves. In any event,
Merrill and Grofman (1997) demonstrate empirically that the projection effects are modest.
A second reason MRL (1998) give for using mean party location is that each party should be able to
take only a single position. Thus, they argue that variation in a party’s location across respondents must be
attributable to measurement error. Others, such as Enelow and Hinich (1994), argue that this interrespondent
variation in party placements is the result mainly of idiosyncratic misperceptions that do bear on voter’s utilities.
Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) suggest that the individual variation in party placements is attributable largely
to interrespondent incomparability in the issue scales (that is, a 3 on one respondent’s scale might correspond
to a different policy position thana3o nanother respondent’s scale). Aldrich and McKelvey develop a clever
techniquethatrescalesrespondents’placementsontoacommonmetric,anapproachthatispreferabletothemean
placement method and may be a reasonable approach to take in future work. However, since the Aldrich and
McKelvey method yields unique party locations, it would also fall prey to the identiﬁcation problems described
in the text.P1: FBW
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Table 3 The MRL approach, mean party placements and ﬁxed effects: Under the general
model, candidate ﬁxed effects make ¯c inestimablea
General
Issue ˆ ¯v ˆ ¯c ˆ ¯2
Directional,
ˆ ¯2 j( ˆ ¯v D ˆ ¯c D 0)
Proximity,
ˆ ¯2 j( ˆ ¯v D ˆ ¯c D ˆ ¯2)
Left–right 0.02 ? 0.90 0.90 0.73
Agriculture ¡0.03 ? 0.25 0.26 0.14
Environment 0.01 ? 0.18 0.18 0.08
Immigration 0.02 ? 0.35 0.35 0.18
Alcohol ¡0.09 ? 0.29 0.29 0.16
Health 0.11 ? 0.25 0.25 0.25
(Average SE) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ˆ ¾ 19.87 19.90 20.93
R2 0.36 0.36 0.29
a The directional model restrictions ﬁt the data slightly better than the proximity model.
estimated, more variable across issues, and overall less clearly distinguishable from zero.
Since cij was replaced by the statistically less variable and hence less powerful cj, this
should come as no surprise. Moreover, since party location variables are ﬁxed for each
party, as the number of issues increases, the estimates of ¯c are increasingly correlated with
any party speciﬁc effect on the feeling thermometer that might be omitted from the model
(as discussed below), making the estimation of ¯c far more difﬁcult. In fact, the number of
parties must exceed the number of issues or ¯c would be inestimable. Nevertheless, with
this methodological adjustment, the results now provide somewhat greater support for the
directional theory of voting—the restriction that ¯c D ¯v D 0 is more consistent with the
data.
MRL also worry that there might be omitted party-speciﬁc attributes that affect feeling
thermometer scores, a standard statistical problem.13 To correct for these possible omitted
party attributes, MRL let ® vary over the parties and so estimate ®j for all j (a so-called
party “ﬁxed-effects” model). Unfortunately, these effects are now perfectly collinear with
the squared party positions cj and so ¯c is no longer estimable.14 This is indicated by the
question marks in the third column in Table 3, where we estimated the general model with
mean party placements and ﬁxed effects.
The last two columns in Table 3 specialize our general model under the competing
assumptions of the directional and proximity models. The ﬁt statistics indicate that the
directional model ﬁts slightly (although “signiﬁcantly”) better than the proximity model.
In the directional model, the restriction that ¯v D 0 has little effect since the unrestricted
13For example, parties involved in scandal may be given relatively low evaluations by all voters, ceteris paribus.
14We can show more intuitively why the party locations are linearly dependent on the set of party ﬁxed effects.
That is, one way to formulate the ﬁxed effects model is to transform the data by mean deviating all the variables
in the data by their within-party means. First, write each observation as
Tij ¡ ¯ Tj D
6 X
kD1
¯vk
¡
v2
ik ¡ ¯ v2
ik
¢
C
6 X
kD1
¯ck
¡
c2
jk ¡c
¯ 2
jk
¢
C
6 X
kD1
¯2k2(vikcjk ¡vikcjk)Ce¡¯ ej
where the bars over the variables indicate their within-party means. However, since c2
jk does not vary across
voters, and c2
jk¡c
¯ 2
jk D0 for all parties j and issues k, the value of ¯ck will have no effect on the ﬁt of the model.P1: FBW
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estimate in the second column is always approximately zero. Since ¯c is inestimable,
the directional model restriction that ¯c D 0 and the proximity model restriction that
¯c D ¯v have no effect whatsoever. Thus, under this set of methodological assumptions,
the proximity model restriction that ¯v D ¯2 does have an effect, as it slightly reduces the
ﬁt of the model. On this basis, then, MRL conclude that the directional model outperforms
the proximity model.
4.3 Assumptions that Favor Proximity Theory
Unlike MRL, Westholm and most other defenders of proximity theory are not concerned
withproblemsthatmightarisefromtheuseofrespondents’idiosyncraticpartyplacements.
However, Westholm ﬁnds other faults with what we have called the standard “optimistic
assumptions.” Westholm argues that feeling thermometers should not be directly compared
across respondents.15 The incomparability of utility measures, either observed as in this
case or latent as in many choice models, is a serious obstacle to the study of political or
consumerchoice. Standardutilitytheoryexplicitlyassumesthatanytwoindividuals’utility
functions need not be comparable. This incomparability is often unproblematic (though
sometimes inconvenient) for developing theoretical results, but for the empirical testing of
utility models it is often devastating. Very rarely are we able to observe the same individual
in a large number of choice settings. Rather we generally observe only interpersonal, rather
than intrapersonal, variation in choice setting. That is, we observe different individuals in
different circumstances choosing over the same alternatives. Therefore, we are forced to
adopt the dubious “representative consumer” assumption (see Hausman and Wise 1978,
pp. 406–407; Kirman 1992). In other words, we treat a set of observations on choices (or,
in this case, feeling thermometer ratings) made by different individuals as if they were the
choices of a single “average” or “representative” individual.
If we observed only one utility value per respondent, we would have little choice but to
treat the feeling thermometer scores as directly comparable across respondents. However,
because in the present case multiple feeling thermometer ratings are recorded for each
respondent, the feeling thermometer scores need not be treated as directly comparable.
Westholm uses this panel-like structure of the data to relax the representative consumer
assumption. By allowing ® to vary by respondent, Westholm’s method effectively treats
differences in, and not levels of, feeling thermometers as comparable across respondents.16
As is often the case, the relaxation of an assumption comes at a cost.17 Speciﬁcally, by
assuming that feeling thermometer scores are strictly comparable across repeated mea-
surements within and across individuals for levels and differences, MRL are able to test
implications of the proximity model such as “A voter should be indifferent between being
15In the simplest case, this would mean that the ®’s and ¯’s vary across respondents. More generally, any
monotonic transformation of utility (in this case, as measured by a feeling thermometer) represents the same
preferences. Brady(1989)considerstheproblemofinterpersonalcomparabilityoffeelingthermometerscoresin
the context of the traditional spatial model. Brady’s model treats the feeling thermometers as ordinal measures.
Transforming the feeling thermometer scores to ranks and applying econometric techniques appropriate for
ranked data is a potentially promising line of future research in the directional voting literature. However, such
methods would, like Westholm’s method, leave ¯v unidentiﬁed.
16Variationinthe®’scouldbeintroducedbytheinclusionofrandomratherthanﬁxedeffects. However,thiswould
require an ex ante assumption to be made about the correlation between the random effects and the independent
variables. Theusualassumptionisthattheeffectsareindependentoftheregressors. UsingaHausman-typetest,
we can reject (Â2(12) D 115:7) the notion of independent random effects in these data (conditional on either
the directional or proximity model).
17It should be noted that Westholm’s method does in fact require the comparison of differences in feeling ther-
mometer scores across respondents. His analysis is not based solely on intrarespondent utility.P1: FBW
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Table 4 The Westholm approach, voter ﬁxed effects: Under the general model, voter ﬁxed
effects make ¯v inestimablea
General
Issue ˆ ¯v ˆ ¯c ˆ ¯2
Directional,
ˆ ¯2 j( ˆ ¯v D ˆ ¯c D 0)
Proximity,
ˆ ¯2 j( ˆ ¯v D ˆ ¯c D ˆ ¯2)
Left–right ? 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.53
Agriculture ? 0.32 0.22 0.29 0.22
Environment ? 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.20
Immigration ? 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.18
Alcohol ? 0.35 0.25 0.26 0.26
Health ? ¡0.21 0.25 0.27 0.21
(Average SE) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ˆ ¾ 18.15 19.08 18.57
R2 0.50 0.43 0.47
a The proximity model restrictions ﬁt the data slightly better than than the directional model.
a strong conservative with Barry Goldwater as president and being a strong liberal with
Lyndon Johnson as president.” This prediction is somewhat forced since people normally
cannot “choose” to be liberals or conservatives in the same way that they can choose to sup-
port Johnson or Goldwater, but nothing in choice theory prevents individuals from having
preferences over outcomes they cannot achieve. Just as one might prefer to have been born
healthy, wealthy, and wise, one can also prefer to be a liberal in Sweden or a conservative
in Utah.
Since voter issue positions are ﬁxed across candidates in his model, and he rules out
direct comparison of two voters’ evaluations of the same candidate, Westholm’s relaxation
of the strong incomparability assumption removes the restriction placed on ¯v.18 Since the
estimates of ¯v in our general model are near-zero, and the proximity model previously
required ¯v D ¯c D ¯2, removing the restriction on ¯v greatly increases the empirical ﬁt of
the proximity model while making it harder to distinguish it from the directional model.
To rule out direct comparisons of the utility levels across voters while still allowing
utility differences to be comparable, Westholm includes voter “ﬁxed effects.” This involves
estimating a separate ®i for each voter (which is equivalent to including a dummy variable
for each voter). Since v2
i is ﬁxed over i, ®i and ¯v (the coefﬁcient on v2
i ) are not separately
identiﬁed. (For example, the estimate of ¯v could be doubled without changing voters’
predicted feeling thermometer scores for any candidate simply by subtracting ¯vv2
i =2 from
each of the previously estimated ®i).
Table 4 provides estimates under Westholm’s assumptions. In our general model, ¯v is
inestimable and hence represented by question marks. Respondent ﬁxed effects have little
18Because the inclusion of voter ﬁxed effects is equivalent to mean-deviating the data by within-voter means, and
because voter positions vik are ﬁxed across parties, we encounter the same identiﬁcation problem for ¯v that we
described above for ¯c with included party ﬁxed effects. Using the mean-deviated forms and letting the bars
over the variables represent within-voter means, we would have
Tij ¡ ¯ Tj D
6 X
kD1
¯vk
¡
v2
ik ¡v2
ik
¢
C
6 X
kD1
¯ck
¡
c2
jk ¡c2
jk
¢
C
6 X
kD1
¯2k2(vikcjk ¡vikcjk)Ce¡¯ ej
Because vik is ﬁxed for each voter i;v ik ¡ ¯ vik D0 for all voters i and ¯v is not identiﬁed.P1: FBW
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effect on estimates of ¯c (compare column 3 in Tables 4 and 1). Since it is not identiﬁed,
the different restrictions on ¯v under the directional and proximity models have no effect
on estimation. However, since unrestricted estimates from the general model of ¯c and
¯2 are both large, the restriction under the proximity model (¯c D ¯2) outperforms the
restrictions under the directional model (¯c D 0), as indicated by the ﬁt statistics in the last
two columns.
5 Concluding Suggestions
Do voters decide based on proximity or direction? Like all inferences, any decision re-
quires making some untestable assumptions. In this case, the alternative possible methods
used to relax the most questionable of these assumptions are far from innocuous. Which
assumptions we choose to relax depends on which seem more important. Westholm and
MRL make very strong, and diametrically opposed, cases for relaxing different assump-
tions. They are both right to a degree, in that each of the methodological problems raised
could seriously bias the results if left untreated. However, the data available are insufﬁcient
to relax all the assumptions at issue in a single model. It is unfortunate that the scholarly
community is left with theoretical analyses for deciding these empirical questions, but until
survey researchers or experimentalists produce better measurement devices, or political
methodologists generate better methodological approaches, the impass will remain. We
now offer some suggestions for future researchers looking for ways to put this debate on
empirically solid microfoundations.
1. It may be possible to design a survey experiment where vi and cij are manipulated
exogenously without error so that Eq. (3) is estimable without assumptions. This
would seem to be an important component of any satisfactory solution, since if we
cannot design an experiment—even in principle—to answer the critical questions at
hand, there is little hope of making inferences from observational data.
2. Scholars could work to demonstrate precisely how feeling thermometer scales are
predicted by demographic variables. This may undermine Westholm’s claim that
they are interpersonally incomparable.
3. WorkbyGrofmanetal. on“projectionbias”mightbeextended, whichmightbeseen
as undermining MRL’s assumptions.
4. Itwouldbeveryhelpfultoextendstudiesthatuseintensiveinterviewsor“debrieﬁngs”
with survey respondents to study precisely how people think about, explain, and
understand our survey questions (e.g., Kaiser 1984). This kind of work is typically
done when pretesting survey instruments, but feeling thermometers and the various
issue questions were never designed to test directional and proximity theories.
5. Much of the debate surrounding directional versus proximity voting comes down to
disagreements about the appropriateness of various additions to the basic parametric
model or to the parameterization itself. For example, some have wondered if, in the
operationalizedproximitymodel,thefeelingthermometershouldbeproportionaltoa
Euclideandistanceor“cityblock”metric, ratherthantoasquaredEuclideandistance
as we (and most others) have assumed. Thus, another fruitful approach may be to
testthesetheoriessemi-ornonparametrically(e.g., Pierce1993). Onesuchapproach
we have explored is to model a person’s feeling thermometer answers on a set of
questions as ordinal rankings (e.g., Bloom and Cavanagh 1986). This type of model
entails some interesting statistical issues that we hope to pursue in future research.P1: FBW
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The body of literature attempting to distinguish proximity vs directional voting has
been growing fast. Yet in our view, this scholarship has been conﬁned to a relatively
narrow methodological tradition, and scholars have analyzed only a few types of data
sets. Unfortunately, there exists essentially no evidence within this tradition and these
data to distinguish between the two models. Perhaps as a consequence, other scholars
have probably paid insufﬁcient attention to this controversy. However, the issue is clearly
critical, as it potentially threatens to undermine a large fraction of the work on formal
rational choice and empirical voting behavior. That there exists no evidence for one of
the most elementary assumptions underlying work in these ﬁelds is worthy of much future
attention. We hope that our research leads future researchers to pursue these important
questions more productively.
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